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For many, the right to use a small path bordering one’s house may seem 
hardly worth a day in court, let alone the additional costs of an appeal. This 
case, recently decided in the Court of Appeal, rested on such an issue. It 
allowed the Court of Appeal to review the law relating to the grant of an 
easement and in particular has served to clarify the law concerning the rule of 
Wheeldon v Burrows1 which allows certain quasi-easements to pass on 
purchase of property. 
The facts are relatively straightforward. Mr and Mrs Kent and Mr and Mrs 
Kavanagh lived next door to each other in a small terrace in Dovercourt Road 
SE 22. A small pathway ran between their two houses and it was accepted that 
the boundary of each house ran mid-way between the two properties. The 
width of the whole path was approximately three feet. Mr and Mrs Kent 
claimed rights over the half of the pathway that did not belong to them. The 
path was used as access to their back gardens and without the right to pass 
over the whole path it was of limited use to them. The value of the path had 
been recognised when the houses had first been built in 1907. Evidence was 
given of a surveyor’s report dated 1909 which had referred to the path. “…I 
think it very important that, even in small houses such as these, the main 
entrance to the street should not be used by tradesmen, street hawkers, etc for 
the entrance of stores and fuel or for carrying out dust, refuse etc...” 
The properties had been originally leased to the occupiers but both had 
been purchased under the Leasehold Reform Act (LRA) 1967.2 The houses 
had changed hands several times since the enfranchisement under the Act but 
although the path had been in use at various times by different owners no 
* LLB , LLM (Lond), Barrister, Lecturer in Law, The University of Buckingham. 
1 (1979) 12 Ch D 31.  
2 The Leasehold Reform Act 1967 allowed tenants under long leases at low rents to 
acquire the freehold or a new lease by paying for the land but not for the house. The 
law was based on the principle that the tenant owned the house because of the length 
of the lease and the landlord could only claim payment for the land. 
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mention was made on the conveyance of the property in January 2001 from 
Mrs Fishlock, the previous owner, to Mr and Mrs Kent. It was in this climate 




The case was heard at first instance at the Central London County Court 
where Mr and Mrs Kent claimed that an easement arose in their favour based 
on various grounds. These included prescription, which is based on long use, 
necessity, which relies on proof that property would be landlocked without 
access being granted and section 62 of the Law of Property Act (LPA) 1925 
as well as the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows. 
The claim for prescriptive use was based on the doctrine of ‘lost modern 
grant’.3 Any claim by prescription must be ‘nec vi, nec clam and nec 
precario’4 which means that it must not be based on violence, or only have 
been exercised in secrecy or with permission of the legal owner. In this case 
there was evidence that there had been permission granted at one stage by the 
predecessor in title of the Kavanaghs so this claim by the Kents was doomed 
to fail. 
The claim for an implied grant under necessity was also unsuccessful 
since there was access to the property through the front door and at one stage 
through the garage; it may have been inconvenient but it was still access. In 
any event, a claim for an implied grant under necessity has always been 
confined to cases where there is simply no other proper access to the 
property.5
The claims under the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows and section 62 of LPA 
were both much stronger grounds but the judge at first instance preferred the 
common law rule to the statute and found in favour of the Kents basing his 
judgment on Wheeldon v Burrows.  
 
THE COURT OF APPEAL 
 
The Court of Appeal was not convinced that this ruling was correct. They 
were however, anxious that the effect of the LRA  would not allow certain 
3 This doctrine presumes that the claimant has a prescriptive easement based on a 
deed or grant that has become lost over the years. This is a fiction and all the parties 
including the court accept this is so. Normally the claimant must show that there has 
been twenty years of use at any time prior to the claim. An interruption to use will not 
be fatal to the claim. 
4 A claim based on prescription will fail where the use is only made with violence or 
in secret or with the permission of the owner. 
5 See Barry v Haseldine [1952] Ch 832. 
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rights previously enjoyed by a tenant to pass into what Mr Justice Lewison 
referred to as a ‘legal black hole.’ He considered the social policy behind the 
LRA 1967 and the fact that under the Act the land is considered to belong to 
the landowner and the house to the occupying leaseholder. He commented 
“…One would expect, therefore, that when a leaseholder of a house acquires 
the freehold of that house in exercise of his rights under the Act, both the 
rights which he enjoyed and the rights which bound him in his capacity as 
leaseholder of the house would be carried through into his new status as 
freeholder when he acquires the land on which the house is built…”6 He was 
concerned that such rights exercised by the tenant would not pass on 
enfranchisement under the Act because of its potential limiting effect. 
The leading judgment was given by Lord Justice Chadwick who preferred 
to rely on s.62 LPA believing that the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows could not 
arise where the land had passed out of common ownership before 
enfranchisement but he nevertheless examined the rule in detail explaining 
why he did not believe it to apply in these circumstances. He asserted, 
“…Under s.62 a conveyance of land operates to convey with the land “all 
ways, easements, rights and advantages whatsoever, appertaining or reputed 
to appertain to the land…or at the time of conveyance, demised…or enjoyed 
with…the land”. I can see no reason why those words are not apt to convey, 
with the freehold, rights of way over the retained land which are, at the time 
of the conveyance, enjoyed by the tenant in occupation of the land conveyed. 
For my part, I find that analysis more attractive than one which relies upon the 
first rule in Wheeldon v Burrows. It seems to me an unnecessary and artificial 
construct to hold the grantor, as common owner and the landlord of the land 
conveyed, is himself using the rights over the retained land which his tenant 
enjoyed under the lease.”7
The rule in Wheeldon v Burrows allows certain quasi easements8 to pass 
when property is sold. It is limited to those that are continuous and apparent 
and necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted and are in 
use at the time of the grant by the owner. It allows the successor in title to the 
vendor to enjoy rights, which would otherwise be lost unless expressly 
included in the conveyance. The rule is based on the presumption against 
derogation from the grant. In this case the issue arose as to whether such 
rights can pass where there is a statutory scheme for enfranchisement. Under 
6 Para 70. 
7 Para 45. 
8 Quasi-easements are those rights, which a landowner may exercise over his own 
land which cannot take effect as a legal easement, but which may become full legal 
easements if part of the land is sold and the vendor retains part for himself. The 
purchaser may be able to claim an easement over the part retained by the vendor if he 
had enjoyed such a right as a quasi –easement. 
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section 8(1) LRA 19679 the landlord is merely required under statute to sell 
the land to the tenant and Lord Justice Chadwick construed the section to 
mean that the landlord does not have to transfer further rights which would 
pass where the land was being sold by the freehold owner to another freehold 
owner or to an existing tenant outside the Act. He stated that “..There is no 
basis upon which to impute to an involuntary transferor an intention to grant 
any larger or further rights than those the statute expressly requires…”10 He 
rejected the argument that the rule could apply to cases of enfranchisement 
under the Act. He also considered whether a tenant could claim an easement 
under Wheeldon v Burrows against another tenant where both had derived 
their title from a common landlord. He concluded that rights could not arise in 
this case because the landlord had not consented to the rights and further it 
had not been shown that the right was being exercised at the time of the 
conveyance. In his view it was significant that the previous claimant had 
chosen to use the shortcut through the garage. 
So finally the claim rested on section 62 LPA 1925, which has the effect 
of passing certain rights which have not been specifically mentioned in the 
conveyance.11 This section has the profound effect in conveyancing of 
sometimes creating easements where previously they had not existed. In one 
case a mere licence to use a shed for storage became a legal easement when 
the tenant renewed her lease12 and a licence to use a landlord’s property for 
access became a legal easement when the tenant later purchased the lease.13 
The section is less specific than the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows about the 
conditions for such a right to arise. In this case it was crucial that the 
claimants did not have to show that it was a right that was reasonably 
necessary for the enjoyment of the property. There had been evidence that use 
had been made of the garage for access and it was tempting to suggest that the 
9 s.8(1) Leasehold Reform Act 1967 where a tenant of a house has under this Part of 
this Act a right to acquire the freehold, and to give to the landlord written notice of his 
desire to have the freehold, then except as provided by this Part of this Act the 
landlord shall be bound to make to the tenant, and the tenant to accept, (at the price 
and on the conditions so provided) a grant of the house and the premises for an estate 
in fee simple absolute, subject to the tenancy and to the tenant’s incumbrances, but 
otherwise free of incumbrances. 
10 Para 36. 
11 This section passes to the transferee all ‘.. fixtures, commons, hedges, ditches, 
fences, waters, watercourses, liberties, privileges, easements, rights and advantages 
whatsoever, appertaining or reputed to appertain to the land, or any part thereof…’ 
12 Wright v Macadam [1949] 2 KB 744. A tenant of a flat had been granted a licence 
to store coal in her landlord’s coal shed. When her lease was renewed there was no 
express reference to the licence and the landlord demanded payment. The court held 
that the licence had become a legal easement. 
13 International Tea Stores Company v Hobbs [1903] 2 Ch 165. 
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route along the path was not necessary when the owners of the property have 
been perfectly content to use the route through the garage. The key feature of 
section 62 is the prior diversity of occupation which of course existed in this 
case.14 Normally this would be a landlord tenant relationship where the tenant 
then purchases the freehold or renews the tenancy and claims rights will pass 
on the transfer.15 In this case the Kents claimed that section 62 operated in 
their favour when the land was first purchased; when both properties were in 
the hands of tenants anxious to claim their statutory right to purchase the 
freehold. The reason why this claim was much more convincing than that of 
Wheeldon v Burrows was that the rights would pass because they had been 
enjoyed previously under the lease and would become crystallised as rights on 
conveyance. The LRA did not affect these rights in the same way as any 
rights under Wheeldon v Burrows. Lord Justice Chadwick summed up the 
position as follows “…The effect, therefore, is that – after enfranchisement of 
both plots A and B –the former tenants of those plots (as owners of the 
freehold) continue to enjoy the same rights over each others’ plots as they did 
while they were each tenants of those plots. If they were entitled to reciprocal 
easements under the former leases, those easements are (in effect) 
enfranchised. They subsist for the benefit of (and as a burden on) the 
respective freehold interests. And it is immaterial which of the two plots was 
the first to be enfranchised…”16 When the head leases were initially granted 
by the first landlord there was careful reference to the fact that each of the 
neighbouring properties owned the land up to the mid point of the path but no 




There is little that an occupier can do with eighteen inches of path without 
rights over the other half of the path. The court accepted that their 
predecessors in title must have had rights over the whole of the path. There 
had been arguments for Mr and Mrs Kavanagh that they owned the whole 
path but if this were the case why did the head lease only convey to them 
rights up to the midway point? The Court of Appeal upheld the claim of Mr 
and Mrs Kent to an easement over half the path based on section 62.  
This was a sensible decision, which passed to the claimants a right to use 
what would appear to a stranger a narrow and insubstantial path. To them, 
however the amenity afforded to the home was something valuable and 
substantial. As an important postscript Mr Justice Lewison commented “…I 
14 The need to satisfy this condition for the operation of s.62 was highlighted in 
Sovmots Investment Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1979] AC 144. 
15 See Wright v Macadam (supra) and International Tea Stores Co v Hobbs (supra). 
16 Para 58. 
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would add that this case demonstrates how important it is for any conveyancer 
concerned with enfranchisement to consider carefully the rights and 
obligations to be contained in the conveyance executed to give effect to the 
tenant’s right to enfranchise; and to ensure that the correct rights are both 
granted and reserved…”17 A moral indeed for everyone involved in 
conveyancing to observe! It is also interesting to note that once again section 
62 has come to the rescue where the conveyancers have failed.  
                                                                                                             
 
17 Para 78  
